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LITIGATING FOR THE RIGHTS
OF HANDICAPPED PEOPLE
Sy DuBow*
Litigating the rights of the handicapped is often a case of sen-
sitizing the court to the myriad of obstacles that handicapped
people face in contemporary society. As the Legal Director for the
National Center for Law and the Deaf, the author has been at the
forefront of this emerging specialty. In this Article, Mr. DuBow
discusses various litigation strategies, including preparing the
handicapped plaintiff for trial, drafting of pleadings and use of
pre-suit correspondence, and arguments in opposition to likely de-
fenses.
The ultimate goal of handicap litigation is not merely identical
treatment such as admission to federally assisted educational pro-
grams, but equivalent treatment, such as providing auxiliary aids to
insure equal opportunity to participate in those programs. The unique
difficulty in achieving this goal through the judicial system is due to
the need to educate and sensitize the court.
Most judges are unaware of all of the obstacles handicapped indi-
viduals must face both because of their handicap, and because of
society's failure to integrate handicapped individuals. Consequently,
many judges do riot react with the same degree of insistence on equal
treatment with regard to disabled individuals as with other protected
classes. Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,1 the entire case from
the initial complaint through pretrial briefs and presentation of evi-
dence must be designed to show the trier of fact that the defendant's
practice discriminates against qualified handicapped individuals.
This Article will discuss the practical aspects of enforcing, through
litigation, the statutory right of handicapped persons to equivalent
treatment as provided by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 2
The analysis will include both offensive tactics for the handicapped
* Legal Director National Center for Law & the Deaf; B.A. Northwestern University, J.D.
George Washington University.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1973).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973) provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in
section 706 (g) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
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plaintiff as well as suggested strategies for overcoming defenses posed
by recipients of federal financial assistance.
PREPARATION FOR TRIAL
Section 504 is a broad policy statement concerning the civil rights
of handicapped people. The long delayed 3 regulations to Section 504
require recipients of federal financial assistance to provide auxiliary
aids to enable qualified handicapped students to participate in a
school's educational programs, 4 to afford a handicapped person an
equal opportunity to benefit friom health, welfare and other social
services, 5 and to "make reasonable accommodation [in employment]
to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
handicapped applicant or employee .... "6
In drafting the complaint under Section 504 for federal court, the
attorney must allege that the plaintiff is a handicapped individual
within the meaning of the regulations. 7 It is also essential to allege
that the plaintiff is a "qualified handicapped person" as defined in the
Section 504 regulations with respect to employment, elementary,
secondary, postsecondary and adult education, and health and social
services. 8 Showing that the handicapped person has been accepted
by a college program demonstrates that he/she is otherxvise qualified
or eligible for auxiliary aids.
3. The regulation to Section 504 was signed May 4, 1977, more than four years after the
passage of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
4. 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d) (1977) and 45 C.F.R. § 84.34(a) (1977).
5. 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(d) (1977).
6. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1977).
7. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (1977) provides:
(j) "Handicapped 'person." (1) "Hlandicapped persons" means any person who (i)
has a physical or mpental impairment which substantially limits one or more major
life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having
such an impairment.
8. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1977) provides:
(k) "Qualified handicapped person" means: (1) With respect to employment, a
handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essen-
tial functions of the job in question; (2) With respect to public preschool, elemen-
tary, secondary, or adult educational services, a handicapped person (i) of an age
during which nonhandicapped persons are provided such services, (ii) of any age
during which it is mandatory under state law to provide such services to handi-
capped persons, or (iii) to whom a state is required to provide a free appropriate
public education under § 612 of the Education of the Handicapped Act; and (3)
With respect to postsecondary and vocational education services, a handicapped
person who meets the academic and technical standards requisite to admission or
participation in the recipient's education program or activity; (4) With respect to
other services, a handicapped person who meets the essential eligibility require-
irents for the receipt of such services.
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In Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 9 the district court,
deciding the case approximately six months before the regulations to
Section 504 became effective, defined the term "otherwise qualified"
in its "ordinary common meaning." 10 The plaintiff had "to [be]
otherwise able to function sufficiently in the position in spite of [her]
handicap, if proper training facilities [were] suitable and availa-
ble.""' Applying this definition, the court found that the plaintiff
was not "otherwise qualified" to be admitted to a nursing program
because her hearing disability would prevent her from completing the
required clinical training, and would restrict her effectiveness as a
registered nurse after graduation.' 2
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred by
considering the nature of the plaintiff's handicap in order to deter-
mine whether or not she was "otherwise qualified" for admittance to
the nursing program.' 3  Rather, under the new regulations to Section
504, the handicapped plaintiff is "qualified" if she "meets the aca-
demic and technical standards requisite to admission or participation
in the recipient's education program or activity."14 The circuit court
also pointed out that a handicapped person's inability to function
effectively in all roles which registered nurses may choose for their
careers should not foreclose them from admission. The court noted
that there are a number of settings in the medical community where
a hearing-impaired person could perform satisfactorily as a registered
nurse, such as in industry or a physician's office. A hearing-impaired
nurse would be especially sensitive to the medical and emotional
needs of hearing-impaired patients.15
The handicapped plaintiff must also allege that the defendant is a
recipient of federal financial assistance. Furthermore, if the defendant
is -a city or county which receives revenue sharing funds, the coin-
plaint should so state, because such municipalities are prohibited
from discriminating on the basis of handicap pursuant to the State
and Local Fiscal Assistance Amendments of 1976.16
In cases in which a handicapped individual or group faces an
emergency situation requiring prompt injunctive relief, 17 further
9. 424 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
10. id. at 1345.
11. ld.
12. Id. at 1345-56.
13. Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978).
14. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3) (1977), quoted with approval at 574 F.2d at 1161.
15. 574 F.2d at 1161 n.6.
16. 31 U.S.C. § 1242(a)(1) (West Supp. 1978).
17. See Williams v. Illinois Dep't of Public Aid (N. D. Ill., filed Feb. 21, 1978) (deaf woman
needed an interpreter to be qualified for food stamps); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F.
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elements must be alleged. The requisite elements will depend how-
ever on where the action is brought because courts vary in the tests
they apply before granting a preliminary injunction. Most circuits re-
quire that the following four prerequisites be alleged and proved: 18
(1) a substantial likelihood the plaintiff will prevail on the merits; (2) the threatened
injury to the plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to the
defendant; (3) granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public in-
terest; (4) a substantial threat that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the
injunction is not granted. 19
Some circuits, however, follow the less rigorous "balance of hard-
ship" test, 20 under which the court need be satisfied only that the
plaintiff has a "'probable' right under which he/she may recover."
The court then must "balance the likelihood of irreparable harm to
the plaintiff against the likelihood of harm to the defendant and if
they decide the balance of hardship should appear in the plaintiff's
favor then the injunction must issue." 21 Furthermore, "considerable
weight is given to the need of protection to the plaintiff as is con-
trasted with the probable injury to the defendant." 22  Unlike the
four prerequisites test, the "balance of hardship" test does not re-
quire proof of likelihood of success on the merits, but only that the
recovering party has a probable right under which he/she can re-
cover. Whichever test the court applies, the moving party must al-
ways prove that he/she will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction
Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977) (deal' student needed interpreter services in class to keep her job);
Bartel v. Biernat, 427 F. Supp. 226 (E. 1). Wis. 1977) (handicapped group confronted a public
transit company which was about to order inaccessible buses); Curmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F.
Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977) (blind teacher applied for a job
vacancy that was about to be filled).
18. Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976); S.E.C. v. Senex
Corp., 534 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1976); Hudson Tire Mart, Inc., v. Aetna Cas. and Stir. Co., 518
F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1975); Canal Auth. of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1974);
Pennsylvania ex rel. Creamer v. U.S.D.A., 426 F.2d 1387 (3rd Cir. 1972); S.E.C. v. Pearson,
426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970); Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 390 F.2d 113
(lst Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 914 (1968); Virginia Petroleum jobbers Ass'n v. F.P.C.,
259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith, Kline and French Labs., 207
F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1953).
19. Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75, 77 (M.D. Fla. 1977), citing Morgan v.
Fletcher, 512 F.2d 236, 239 (5th Cir. 1975).
20. Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., Inc., 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977);
Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Midland Oil Co., 55 F.2d 42 (4th Cir. 1932).
21. Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635, 637 (D.S.C. 1977).
22. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Midland Oil Co., 55 F.2d 42, 45 (4th Cir. 1932).
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does not issue. 23 This is the most crucial prerequisite to the granting
of a preliminary injunction.
"Irreparable harm" is an elusive term, usually defined on a case by
case basis. However, there are certain general characteristics of "ir-
reparable harm" which help define the concept. The alleged injury
must be such that it could not adequately be redressed by final relief
after the trial.24 Thus, if the trial on the merits can be held before
the occurrence of the injury, there is no irreparable harm. 25  Simi-
larly, if money damages at trial could adequately compensate plaintiff
for the alleged injury there is no irreparable harm. However, if the
type of injury cannot be readily measured in monetary terms, e.g.,
damages to reputation, emotional distress, or speculative loss of fu-
ture profits, then there is a greater likelihood that irreparable harm
will be found. 26 Even when money damages are adequately and eas-
ily ascertainable, if the potential economic loss is as great, courts are
more likely to find irreparable harm. 27 When plaintiff alleges depri-
vation of constitutional rights, he/she need not show irreparable
harm; irreparable harm is presumed. 28
What constitutes irreparable harm in an action brought on Section
504? In Barnes v. Converse College 29 the court found irreparable
harm in plaintiff's imminent loss of employment as a teacher if she
was not able to succeed in her courses. 30 In Duran v. City of
Tampa, 31 the court refused to find irreparable harm from mere loss
of income or damage to reputation. 32  In that case, an epileptic indi-
vidual applied for a position in the police force and was rejected sole-
ly because of his handicap. He brought an action under Section 504
and sought a preliminary injunction, The court was convinced that
alleged injuries could be adequately redressed by final relief after a
trial on the merits. This holding seems contrary to the general princi-
23. Parks v. Dunlop, 517 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir. 1975); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2948, at 431 (1973) [hereinafter cited as C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER].
24. New York Path. & X-Ray Labs., Inc., v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 523 F.2d
79, 81 (2d Cir. 1975).
25. Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
26. Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
27. New York Path. & X-Ray Labs., Inc. v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 523 F.2d at
81.
28. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1858 v. Callaway, 398 F. Supp. 176, 194
(N.D. Ala. 1975); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 23, at 440.
29. Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.SC. 1977).
30. Id. at 638.
31. Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (1977).
32. Id. at 79.
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pie that money cannot fully compensate a person for damage to repu-
tation. The most significant factor in the Duran court's decision not to
issue a preliminary injunction was that "an almost immediate trial of
these issues [was] anticipated." 3  This fact makes the court's deci-
sion more consistent with the principles governing issuance of a pre-
liminary injunction. The court simply reflected the general reluctance
to impose such a drastic prior restraint when plaintiff's claim would
soon be redressed at a trial on the merits.
Pre-suit correspondence is another important aspect of handicapped
litigation. In drafting the statement of facts, it is crucial to list the
pre-suit correspondence in chronological order. This should include
the client's first written request for auxiliary aids, accommodations or
services, and the defendant's reasons for denial. Of course, sub-
sequent written requests for auxiliary aids should be noted. The cor-
respondence will frequently show that the recipient did not try to
seek other funding sources, as is required by the regulations, but put
the burden on the handicapped person. The pre-suit correspondence
may also reveal that the defendant's sole basis for denial was due to
the plaintiff's handicap. This should be alleged in a separate clause.
Usually, defendants will readily admit that the disability3 4 was the
sole cause, but will justify their actions for reasons of cost of accom-
modation, job-relatedness, safety, or that the individual didn't satisfy
financial prerequisites for auxiliary aids.
The plaintiff frequently is the most effective witness. Through live
testimony, he/she can demonstrate to the court whether he/she needs
an auxiliary aid; why participation in a classroom would be difficult
without one; why other alternatives are not feasible; and what ir-
reparable employment, career, and economic consequences to be
faced without an accommodation. For example, in Barnes, the plain-
tiff's testimony through an interpreter showed the court her need for
a qualified interpreter to fully understand and participate in a class-
room situation. 35
The plaintiff's live testimony can also help remove any stereotype
or misconceptions the court may have about the person's handicap.
Plaintiff's testimony will help the judge understand the nature of the
33. id.
34. In some cases, the defendants had a policy against hiring handicapped persons. See,
e.g., Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3rd Cir. 1977) and King-Smith v. Aaron, 455 F.2d
378 (3rd Cir. 1972). In Davis, the defendants readily stated disability as the sole reason for not
accepting a deaf' woman in their nursing program. Davis v. Southeastern Community College,
574 F.2d at 1162.
35. Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635, 636-37 (D.S.C. 1977).
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problem and demonstrate how a handicapped person can participate
in an educational program with auxiliary aids or perform in a particu-
lar job with a reasonable accommodation. Reasonable accommodation
may include job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, and the provision
of readers or interpreters. 36 The acquisition of telecommunication
devices can help a deaf person use the telephone. 37 For a hard-of-
hearing person, the modification of telephone equipment with an
amplifier can enable them to communicate through the telephone.
To be an effective witness, the plaintiff must be thoroughly pre-
pared on what to expect in the court proceedings, including the type
of questions that may be asked from the defendant's counsel on
cross-examination. For a deaf plaintiff or witness, a pre-trial orienta-
tion with the interpreter is essential to ensure that they both fully
understand one another and to enable the interpreter to determine
the client's level of communication. For example, if the deaf person
only uses American Sign Language (ASL), the interpreter must be
qualified to interpret in ASL. If the interpreter has difficulty reading
the signs of the deaf person, it may be necessary to have a deaf per-
son, skilled in reading signs, appointed to reverse interpret.
In preparation for trial, counsel for the plaintiff should gather vari-
ous types of documentary evidence. If defendants question the plain-
tiff's disability, attorneys for the plaintiff should have current medical
reports establishing the person s disability. In the case .f a hearing-
impaired plaintiff, a recent audiologist's report showing the level and
range of hearing loss and the extent to which it is correctable with a
hearing aid should be introduced. Evidence should also be gathered
showing that handicapped people have worked successfully in a par-
ticular field. Evidence was introduced in Gurmankin to show that
numerous blind teachers functioned well in the classroom, thereby
challenging the justification for blanket exclusion of blind teachers. To
further support the irrebuttable presumption argument, the plaintiff's
attorney should try to call as witnesses handicapped individuals who
have successfully completed an academic program, such as nursing
school or medical school, or successfully performed in careers in
which the defendant has excluded handicapped people. 38 When recip-
36. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b) (1977).
37. The telecommunication device for the deaf enables hearing-impaired people to com-
municate over ordinary telephone lines by typing on a keyboard which prints on a similar
device at the other end of the telephone.
38. For example, it might have changed the judge's mind in Davis, if deaf licensed regis-
tered nurses testified how they successfully performed in the clinic aspects of nursing school
programs and how they are able to successfully work in various nursing positions after gradua-
11071978] LITIGATION
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ients speculate as to astronomical costs for providing auxiliary aids
and reasonable accommodations, attorneys for handicapped individu-
als should present expert testimony from interpreters and readers,
manufacturers of auxiliary aids, or spokespersons from institutions
that have made their programs accessible at reasonable expense.
Expert witnesses should also be used to analyze and testify as to
the validation and job-relatedness of challenged tests. The Regulation
requires that a test be job-related for the position in question and
does not reflect the applicant's or employee's impaired sensory, man-
ual or speaking skills. 39  An admissions test or admissions criterion
for colleges and universities may not be used if it has a disproportion-
ate, adverse effect on handicapped persons, unless the test or criter-
ion has been validated as a predictor of success in the educational
program. The tests must not measure the applicant's impaired sen-
sory, manual, or speaking skills. 40
An attorney on a tight budget and with limited resources should try
to enter into a stipulation with defendant on several issues. A few
examples are agreeing that the plaintiff is handicapped; that the de-
fendant receives federal financial assistance; and that the sole reason
for excluding the plaintiff was his/her disability. The attorney should
also enlist the help of handicapped groups in gathering data and wit-
nesses, as well as informing counsel on ways to deflate the defend-
ant's cost estimates for accommodations. Handicapped individuals and
groups may provide several innovative sorutions because they have
confronted these problems most of their lives. 4 1  The President's
tion such as in an infirmary at a college or school for deaf students, in a teaching position, in an
industrial nursing setting or in a doctor's office.
39. 45 C.F.R. § 84.13 (1977) provides:
(a) A recipient may not make use of any employment test or other selection criter-
ion that screens out or tends to screen out handicapped persons or any class of
handicapped persons unless: (1) the test score or other selection criterion, as used
by the recipient, is shown to be job-related for the position in question, and (2)
alternative job-related tests or criteria that do not screen out or tend to screen out
as many handicapped persons are not shown by the Director to be available.
(b) A recipient shall select and administer tests concerning employment so as best
to ensure that, when administered to an applicant or employee who has a handicap
that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, the test results accurately reflect
the applicant's or employee's job skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor the test
purports to measure, rather than reflecting the applicant's or employee's impaired
sensory, manual, or speaking skills (except where these skills are the factors that the
test purports to measure).
40. 45 C.F.R. § 84.42 (b)(3) (1977).
41. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Select Education of the Commission of Educa-
tion and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. III-V (1977).
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Commission on Employment for the Handicapped maintains a direc-
tory of organizations of and for the handicapped that an attorney can
use.
THE DEFENSES
A typical defense raised by recipients for noncompliance with Sec-
tion 504 is that the accommodation for handicapped people will be
too costly. Plaintiff's counsel must point out that according to the
Secretary of HEW, costs for accommodations provide no basis for
exemption from Section 504 and the regulation. 42 In Davis, the
court of appeals found that the regulation and case law 43 "supports
the requirements of affirmative conduct on the part of certain entities
under Section 504, even when such modifications become expen-
sive.' 44  The appeals court advised the district court to give close
attention on remand to the affirmative modifications set out in the
regulation. 45
42. Secretary of HEW Califano stated in his introduction to the regulation the following:
ending discriminatory practices and providing equal access to programs may involve
major burdens on some recipients. Those burdens and costs, to be sure, provide no
basis for exemption from section 504 or this Regulation: Congress' mandate to end
discrimination is clear. 42 Fed. Reg. 22676 (1977).
43. Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158, 1162 (4th Cir. 1978), citing
United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413, 415-16 (8th Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional
Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1281-84 (7th Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F.
Supp. 635, 637 (D.S.C. 1977); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180, 184 (S.D. W. Va. 1976).
44. 574 F.2d at 1162.
45. Id. 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(a) (1977) provides:
Academic requirements. A recipient to which this subpart applies shall make such
modifications to its academic requirements as are necessary to ensure that such
requirements do not discriminate or have the effect of discriminating, on the basis
of handicap, against a qualified handicapped applicant or student. Academic re-
quirements that the recipient can demonstrate are essential to the program of in-
struction being pursued by such student or to any directly related licensing re-
quirement will not be regarded as discriminatory within the meaning of this section.,
Modifications may include changes in the length of time permitted for the comple-
tion of degree requirements, substitution of specific courses required for the com-
pletion of degree requirements, and adaptation of the manner in which specific
courses are conducted.
45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d)(1) provides:
Auxiliary aids. (1) A recipient to which this subpart applies shall take such steps as
are necessary to ensure that no handicapped student is denied the benefits of,
excluded from participation in, or otherwise subjected to discrimination under the
education program or activity operated by the recipient because of the absence of
educational auxiliary aids for students with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking
skills.
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Courts have also recognized that cost is not a defense to providing
equal educational opportunity to handicapped children, 46 or equal
access to public transportation for handicapped people. 47  Plaintiff's
counsel should indicate that defendants often can reduce substantially
the cost of making their programs accessible by using available tax
deductions. Under Section 2122 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, recip-
ients that pay federal income tax are eligible to claim a tax deduc-
tion of up to $25,000 for architectural and transportation modifications
made to improve accessibility for handicapped persons. 48
In the case of colleges and universities, the regulation to Section
504 requires the educational institution to assist students in finding
other resources for auxiliary aids. However, the ultimate responsibil-
ity for providing the auxiliary aids rests with the college or univer-
sity. 49  Some colleges and universities have argued that handicapped
individuals must also prove financial need to obtain auxiliary aids.
46. In Mills v. Board of Ed., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), the Federal District Court
ruled that an alleged lack of money did not excuse the defendant school board's failure to meet
the Constitutional and statutory obligations to provide public education for handicapped chil-
dren. The court held as follows:
[i]f sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and programs that
are needed and desirable in the system then the available funds must be extended
equitably ... the inadequacies of the District of Columbia Public School System
...cannot be permitted to bear more heavily on the 'exceptional' or handicapped
person than on the normal child.
348 F. Supp. at 876.
In Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180, 184 (S.D. W. Va. 1976) the court held school
officials must make every effort to include such "minimally handicapped" children within the
regular public classroom situation even at great expense to the school system.
47. In Washington Urban League v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. No., 776-72
(D.D.C. 1973), a court ruled that it violated the federal architectural barrier law for Metro to
construct without elevators twenty subway stations since it made them inaccessible to physically
handicapped persons. The court ordered that the stations be remodelled at a cost of 65 million
dollars. See also Weiss, Equal Employment and the Disabled, 10 COLUm. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
457, 491 (1974); Bartels v. Biernat, 427 F. Stipp. 226 (E.). Wis. 1977). The court in Bartels
enjoined acquisition of new mass transit vehicles unless designed for accessibility. The court
only permitted acquiring non-accessible vehicles with federal funds if defendant showed a com-
pelling necessity such as "that a failure of the system would result." 427 F. Supp. at 233.
48. See 42 Fed. Reg. 17870 (1977) adopting 26 C.F.R. § 7.0 (1976). South Carolina's in-
come tax law includes a tax deduction for making buildings intended for public use accessible to
physically disabled people. S.C. CODE § 12-7-700(16) (1976). Such tax benefits weaken a recip-
ient's cost excuses for not hiring or providing services for handicapped people.
In negotiating a case with a recipient, plaintiff's attorney may suggest that recipients hard
pressed for funds explore other sources to pay for accommodations, such as the state Vocational
Rehabilitation (V.R.) Agency and charitable organizations. State V.R. Agencies are required
under Section 101 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to provide a specified level of rehabilitation
services. Those services must include: (1) interpreter services for deaf persons; (2) reader serv-
ices for blind persons; and (3) telecommunication and other sensory devices on the job. 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (Supp. V 1975).
49. 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d) (1977) and the analysis at 42 Fed. Reg, 22692, 22693 (1977).
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However, a deaf student's ability to pay for his own interpreter is not
a valid reason to deny his request. The regulations to Section 504
require recipients of federal aid to make their programs equally ac-
cessible to qualified handicapped persons through the use of auxiliary
aids,50 a duty not contingent upon the financial needs of the hand-
icapped individual involved.
Recipients may also argue that they are complying with the regula-
tions by providing as an interpreter a person with a limited knowl-
edge of sign language. Hospitals, social service offices and schools
occasionally use as interpreters staff people or volunteers who know
only how to fingerspell and cannot read the signs of a deaf person.
The regulation, however, requires effective communication, meaning
that qualified interpreters who can readily communicate with a deaf
person must be provided. 51
Another tactic used by colleges and universities is urging the hand-
icapped individual to go to other schools, 52 or to participate in the
programs of the one school in a geographic area which is to be made
accessible to handicapped persons. Other colleges and universities- in
that area would also participate in that school's program. HEW has
stated in its analysis to the regulations that such an educational con-
sortium for the postsecondary education of handicapped students
would not constitute compliance with the regulation on program ac-
cessibility. 53
Safety is a frequent defense in handicap employment discrimination
cases. Safety, however, is often used by employers too broadly. The
plaintiff's lawyer must present evidence on how the individual plain-
tiff, or other similarly situated handicapped people, have been able to
perform the job without endangering the lives of their co-workers or
themselves. In Milwaukee R.R. v. Wisconsin Department of Industry,
Labor and Human Relations, 54 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
50. 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d) (1977).
51. 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d)(2) (1977) and 45 C.F.R. § 84.52 (c) (1977).
52. In the Barnes case, the defendant college suggested that other schools or correspon-
dence courses would be a reasonable alternative for the plaintiff.
53. The analysis to the Regulation states:
The Department believes that such a consortium, when developed and applied only
to handicapped persons, would not constitute compliance with § 84.22, but would
discriminate against qualified handicapped persons by restricting their choice in
selecting institutions of higher education and would, therefore, be inconsistent with
the basic objectives of the statute.
42 Fed. Reg. 22689 (1977).
54. Milwaukee R.R. v. Wisconsin Dep't. of Indus., Labor, and Human Relations, 8 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 938 (Wis. Sup. Ct. 1974). See also Milwaukee R.R. v. Washington Human
Rights Comm., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 854 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1975); Lang, Employment
Rights of the Handicapped, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 703 (Dec., 1977).
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that a person with asthma and possible back problems would not,
because of these disabilities, necessarily endanger his safety in work-
ing as a laborer in a diesel house. The court noted the plaintiff's
previous competency on jobs requiring strenuous labor and the ab-
sence of medical testimony "that the working conditions were or
would be in the future, hazardous to his health." 55
Another common defense tactic in a discrimination case under Sec-
tion 504 is urging that plaintiffs exhaust their administrative remedies
with HEW. However, the United States Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit have recognized as well-
settled that administrative remedies need not be sought if they are
inadequate or applied in such a manner as to, in effect, deny
petitioners their rights.56 It is equally well established that excessive
and undue federal agency delays may make an administrative remedy
inadequate. 57 Cases have held that administrative delays of one and
two years were sufficiently excessive to justify waiver of exhaus-
tion. 58 The 1978 Annual Operating Plan of the Office of Civil Rights
(OCR), HEW's investigatory and enforcement organization, dem-
55. 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 941.
56. United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, 384 U.S. 424 (1965); McCoy v. Greensboro
City Bd. of Educ., 283 F.2d 667 (4th Cir. 1960).
57. In Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 (1923), Justice Holmes indicated
that the Court, in waiving the exhauistion requirement because of excessive delays by the ad-
ministrative agency, would look not only at the state administrative procedure as it existed in
statute, but also at how the agency functioned in fact. See also Adkins v. School Bd. of Newport
News, 148 F. Supp. 430, 443 (E.D. Va. 1957), aff'd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 855 (1957).
In Camenisch v. University of Texas, No. A-78-CA-061 (W. D. Tex. May 17, 1978), Federal
Judge Jack Roberts found that the court must consider the time involved for HEW exhaustion
and the effect on the plaintiff. The court noted that:
[t]he applicable HEW regulations contain no provisions for providing emergency
relief of the nature requested by plaintiff. All administrative complaints are treated
similarly. Plaintiff submits . . . The Office for Civil Rights' Annual Operating Plan
for Fiscal Year 1978 reveals that only 26 of 756 handicap complaints filed in 1978
will be investigated. An HEW finding in plaintiff's favor one or two years from now
will give him no effective relief whatsoever, for, as the stipulations show, he may
very well have lost his employment by then.
Id. at 2-3.
In Camenisch, a deaf student moved for a preliminary injunction in federal court to obtain
interpreter services without first filing an HEW complaint. Judge Roberts pointed out that
"[s]everal courts have held that despite failure to seek an administrative recourse, administrative
exhaustion should not be imposed in all instances if there is no realistic possibility of a meaning-
ful remedy." Alexander v. Yale, No. N-77-277 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 1977); Grossman v. Texas
Tech Univ., No. CA-5-77-23, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 1977), Judge Roberts issued a
preliminary injunction against the University of Texas to procure an interpreter for the plaintiff
during his completion of his Master's work at the University of Texas and as a condition of
preliminary injunctive relief. Plaintiff was required to initiate a complaint with HEW.
58. Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591 (1926).
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onstrates the futility of exhaustion. 59  The operating plan stated
that out of the projected 664 handicap complaints within OCR juris-
diction to be filed in Fiscal Year 1978, only 26 will be investigated 60
with several regions not investigating any new handicap com-
plaints. 61 Of the 453 backlogged handicap complaints only 14 will be
investigated. 62
Another argument for the plaintiff is that a litigant need not
exhaust his administrative remedies if such remedies do not exist.
Thus, when the handicapped plaintiff needs emergency relief, such as
to avoid termination of employment, as in Barnes, administrative
remedies are not available since OCR has no provision in the regula-
tions nor any established administrative mechanism to provide
emergency relief.6 3 It should be also noted that private suits by per-
59. 43 Fed. Beg. 7048 (1978). See also Crawford v. University of North Carolina, 440 F.
Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977). (date of decision was November 1, 1977 and five months after
plaintiff's counsel filed a complaint with OCR pursuant to court order, OCR still had not inves-
tigated the Crawford complaint).
60. 43 Fed. Reg. 7054 (1978).
61. Region I in Boston, Region III in Philadelphia, Region IV in Atlanta, Region V in
Chicago, Region VII in Kansas City, Region IX in San Francisco and Region X in Seattle.
Information from tables prepared by HEW, Office of Civil Rights.
62. 43 Fed. Reg. 7054. "Backlog Complaints" means complaints on hand as of 10/1/77 in
which the investigation had not begun.
OCR will give the highest investigative priority to carryover complaints, which are complaints
in which investigations began prior to October 1, 1977, 43 Fed. Reg. 7050 (1978). There were
112 carryover handicap complaints and OCR hopes to finish investigation of 101 of these.
OCR's record on resolving complaints for violations of Title VI and Title IX is dismal. In
STALLED AT THE START: GOVERNMENT ACTION ON SEX BIAS IN THE SCIIOOLS, PROJECT ON
EQUAL EDUCATION RIGHTS, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND
(Nov. 1977). A study conducted on Title IX showed that from 1973 to 1976, OCR investigated
and resolved only 179 complaints out of 973 complaints filed for violations of Title IX, which
prohibits discrimination based on sex in federally funded schools and colleges. In Adams v.
Weinberger (now Adams v. Califano), 391 F. Supp. 269 (D.D.C. 1975), the court held that the
failures of HEW to enforce statutes prohibiting segregation and to bring to the attention of the
courts information concerning failures to comply with judicial desegregation orders required the
granting of future injunctive relief. Judge Pratt found that:
HEW has often delayed too long in ascertaining whether a complaint or other in-
formation of racial discrimination constitutes a violation of Title VI. HEW has also
frequently failed to commence enforcement proceedings by administrative notice of
hearing or any other means authorized by law although the efforts to obtain volun-
tary compliance have not succeeded during a substantial period of time. As shown
in Section D above, in 39 'unresolved' Swann districts, HEW, having failed during
a substantial period of time to achieve voluntary compliance has not commenced
enforcement procedures by administrative notice of hearing or any other means
authorized by law. Apart from the school districts expressly covered by this Court's
February 16, 1973 Order, HEW has not initiated a single administrative enforce-
ment proceeding against a southern school district since the issuanc@ of this Court's
Order 25 months ago.
391 F. Supp. at 273.
63. See Camenisch, slip op. at 2.
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sons acting as private attorneys general "are an invaluable supplement
to governmental enforcement and help to vindicate the nondiscrimi-
nation policies to which Congress afforded a high priority. In view of
the large number of recipients of federal financial assistance who are
covered by the nondiscrimination provision of Section 504, the Act's
laudable goal could be severly hampered . . . if each citizen were
required to depend solely on litigation instituted at the discretion of
the [federal government]." 64
Finally, recipients can be expected to argue that the regulation as
applied constitutes a deprivation of their property without due pro-
cess of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
These recipients will assert that the regulations take their money for a
public service without just compensation. Plaintiff's counsel should
argue that the regulations do not constitute a taking but are simply a
congressional exercise of its constitutional power to impose reasonable
regulations on recipients of federal financial assistance. The power of
Congress to enact legislation of this sort is based upon the General Wel-
fare Clause of the Constitution. 65  This clause is expansive in scope,
giving Congress wide discretionary power.6 6 It has been the basis
for a host of regulations, including those which place conditions on
the recipients of federal financial assistance. 67  The Supreme Court in
64. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). See also Allen v.
State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 (1969); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390
U.S. 400, 401-402 (1968).
Moreover, the Davis court suggested that should administrative exhaustion be applicable, a
court could consider if a plaintiff may be awarded any relief pendente lite:
On remand, and since the advent of the HEW regulations, the district court might
also deem it advisable to consider other legal issues which we did not reach in this
opinion, namely: (1) What is the effective date concerning the relevant sections of
the HEW regulations, if any? (2) Did the promulgation of the Section 504 regula-
tions by HEW, and specifically, 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.6-84.10, and separately 45 C.F.R.
§§ 80.6-80.10 and 45 C.F.R. Part 81 create administrative relief that must be
exhausted? (3) Is the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" applicable, and if so, how?
(4) Should administrative exhaustion and/or "primary jurisdiction" be applicable,
should plaintiff be awarded any relief pendente lite?
Of course, we express no opinion on the merits concerning these issues, but at least
one court has grappled with these issues that are not before us. Crawford v. Uni-
versity of North Carolina, 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C.-Magistrate's Findings and
Order adopting same, entered Sept. 1, 1977, and Nov. 1, 1977, respectively; C-77-
173-D; Ward, U.S.D.J.) (deaf handicapped graduate student seeking to compel pro-
vision of an interpreter to aid him in completing his school work); see also Lloyd v.
Regional Transportation Authority, 548 F.2d at 1286, n.29.
Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158, 1163 n.9 (4th Cir. 1978).
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
66. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
67. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n,
330 U.S. 127 (1947).
1114
LITIGATION
Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, 68 stated flatly
that the United States "does have the power to fix the terms upon
which its money allotments to states shall be disbursed." 69 In Lau
v. Nichols, 70 the Supreme Court specifically approved federal legisla-
tion which attached anti-discrimination conditions to money allotted
to the states. 71 This type of regulation has been upheld in both Title
VI and Title IX cases, after which Section 504 was patterned. 72
In addition to their constitutional obligation to conform to the re-
quirements of Section 504, recipients are bound by a contractual ob-
ligation. HEW sends to each recipient an Assurance of Compliance
Agreement in which recipients consent to comply with Section 504
and its regulations, guidelines, and interpretations. The agreement
states that federal financial assistance is extended to a recipient in
reliance on this Assurance of Compliance. This acts as a binding obli-
gation upon the recipient for the period during which federal financial
assistance is extended. A recipient's failure to comply with the re-
quirements of Section 504 constitutes a breach of this agreement with
HEW. Having signed this Assurance of Compliance, a recipient can-
not subsequently argue that one of the terms of the contract consti-
tutes a taking without just compensation.
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Lau v. Nichols, 73 with
which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined, stated that
plaintiffs could sue as third party beneficiaries of the contract be-
tween HEW and a school district receiving Title VI money. The fed-
eral judge in Crawford v. University of North Carolina, 74 relied on
this third party beneficiary statement to find a probable right of ac-
tion for a deaf graduate student to enforce the Regulation to Section
504.
68. 330 U.S. 127 (1.947).
69. Id. at 143.
70. 414 U.S. 563 (1973).
71. Id. at 569.
72. See Contractor's Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir. 1971); Bossier
Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967). See
also Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970).
As a result, regulation by the federal government of the manner in which the defendant
spends its resources is not a taking in the classic sense of the concept. See United States v.
Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
73. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571, n.2 (1974).
74. 440 F. Snpp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
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CONCLUSION
Through proper preparation of the handicapped plaintiff for trial,
skillful drafting of pleadings and the careful use of presuit correspon-
dence, attorneys can aggressively defend the rights of handicapped
people as provided by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Only then will
Section 504 truly create "a mandate to end discrimination [that will]
bring handicapped persons into the mainstream of American
life. 75
Sy DuBow
75. 42 Fed. Reg. 22676 (1977).
